本分析證實，以股權交換的收購者花費在並購前的宣傳開銷要比使用現金的收購者相對較高。最後，盡管我們根本不可知道通過哪種宣傳手段能夠提升股價，從而使並購前的業主獲益，但我們試圖針對此課題提供壹些初步證據。
First, we attempt to relate insider stock OWN with advertising activities priorto the stock-based acquisition. If managers attempt to increase stock pricesthrough increased advertising for sel?sh reasons, they are more likely to do sowhen they have more OWN in their ?rm [4]. The evidence we present in the paperis indeed consistent with this notion. Surprisingly, when we attempt to linkthe deal ratio(DR; de?ned as the ratio of the deal value (price paid to thetarget for the acquisition)divided by the acquirer’s immediate past?scal-year-end market value of the equity) with advertising expenses prior tothe acquisition we do not ?nd anyevidence that suggests that increased advertising is linked with DRs that arebene?cial to the managers of the acquiring ?rms.
首先，以股權交換的收購前期，我們試圖將OWN的內部股票與廣告宣傳活動聯系起來。如果管理者是為了私利而加強宣傳來提升股價的話，他們很有可能會這樣做如果當時他們的公司已擁有更多的OWN股票。本文所顯示的證據確實與這個觀念是壹致的。出乎意料的是，當我們試圖將並購交易比率（即是將支付給被收購方的並購交易價值，除於收購方在剛過去的財政年度結束時的市場價值）與收購前的廣告宣傳開銷聯系起來時，我們未發現任何證據可以表明加強宣傳能夠改變並購交易比率使收購公司的管理者獲益。